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Abstract 
This paper assesses the efforts to “clean up” financial markets and corporate 
governance practices in the wake of the bankruptcies and scandals of the early 
2000s. It begins by reviewing what actually happened during that period, what 
damages ensued and the responses of government enforcement agencies and 
policy makers, then assesses the impact of the various actions that followed and 
their effectiveness. The paper then looks at these actions in an historical context, 
examining the possibilities of imbalances of power between market insiders and 
ordinary investors that provide an uneven market environment. Finally, it 
discusses actions that might be taken to have a greater impact on leveling the 
uneven market, and what might be expected in the way of altered governance 
practices for the future.   
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 This year is the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the tech bubble in 
the stock market that began after the commercialization of the Internet and 
through it the development of a “new economy” led by “dot.coms” and other 
Internet enabled companies. These developments drove a tremendous stock 
market expansion from 1995 until the end of the 1990s, during which the 
NASDAQ index increased five-fold.   
Early in 2000, however, the air began to leak out of the bubble, and by 
year end there was a widespread reduction in valuation of technology stocks of 
about 30%.  This market drop sharply affected other businesses that relied on 
Internet technology, causing several to fail outright, or to slide out of control or to 
engage in account gimmickry in order to shore up their profits. In By December 
2001, when Enron, the seventh largest company in America and one of its 
leading “new-economy” concept companies, filed for bankruptcy, the NASDAQ 
index had fallen 74% from its high of less than two years earlier. In 2001 there 
were 171 large corporate bankruptcies involving liabilities of $230 billion, more 
than twice the level in 2000, the previous record year for bankruptcies. In July 
2002, WorldCom, the countries second largest long-distance telecom company 
with $107 billion in assets filed for bankruptcy after revealing recent instances of 
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accounting fraud. Throughout 2002 bankruptcies involving liabilities of $338 
billion occurred, thus establishing a three-year period in which American 
bankruptcies – the ultimate form of corporate failure – broke all previous 
records.1  
In addition, instances of accounting failures (in the form of “restatements” 
of prior audited financial results due to accounting errors) nearly quadrupled in 
the four-year period 1998-2001 to 616 cases.2  Restatements continued to occur 
at a record level during 2002, when 330 cases were reported, 22% more than in 
2001. As a consequence of these failures, federal securities-fraud class-action 
lawsuits seeking damages from officers, directors and advisers of the companies 
involved exploded. 489 such suits were filed in 2001 (of which 312 were related 
to initial public offerings) and 259 more in 2002, as compared to an average of 
194 filings per year during the three years prior to passage of the Private 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a bill that was designed to substantially limit the 
number of such class action lawsuits.3 Many of these lawsuits were the 
consequence of stock prices that fell rapidly, causing losses (damages) to 
investors, when such stock price declines followed sudden news of changed 
financial information  
 The financial losses caused by these failures were disproportionate. Bank-
loan write offs for 2001-2002 were in the tens of billions of dollars. Publicly traded 
non-investment grade bond defaults for 2002 were (at par value) $96.9 billion -- 
the highest level of such defaults then recorded -- representing 12.8% of all such 
outstanding issues. In 2001 the default rate of these bonds was 9.8%, the 
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highest then since 1999. On the assumption that the bond defaults will result in 
recoveries (through bankruptcy or other work-out arrangements) equal to the ten-
year historical average of about 30%, then the expected losses from loan write 
offs and from bond defaults for the two year period would be about $100 billion.   
Equity market losses in 2001-2002 attributable to fears of corporate 
failures due to misgovernance were far greater: the S&P 500 peaked at 1527 in 
March, 2000 and then, reflecting the end of the technology bubble (which 
affected NASDAQ listed stocks much more), fell steadily to 966 in September, 
2001, but then recovered by year-end 2001 to nearly 1200. But, even after clear 
signs of recovery in the economy and in corporate earnings were evident early in 
2002, the influences of the Enron bankruptcy in December 2001 and other 
corporate surprises affected the market and the S&P 500 index reversed 
direction and fell further. Unlike the periods following recovery from previous 
recessions, the stock market continued to sag, with the S&P 500 index reaching 
a five-year low of 798 on July 23, 2002, down 33% for the year (reflecting a loss 
of about $4 trillion of market capitalization), and lower by more than 47% from its 
all-time high two and a half years earlier. For many industries suspected of 
accounting or governance shortcomings (e.g., telecom, health care, energy 
services and technology), share price declines were even greater. As a 
consequence of these failures, federal securities-fraud class-action lawsuits 
seeking damages from officers, directors and advisers of the companies involved 
exploded. 489 such suits were filed in 2001 (of which 312 were related to initial 
public offerings) and 259 more in 2002.4 Many of these lawsuits were the 
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consequence of stock prices that fell rapidly, causing losses (damages) to 
investors, when such stock price declines followed sudden news of changed 
financial information.   
 These losses were not just felt by the rich. In 2002, a survey conducted by 
the Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association 
reported that 52.7% of American households owned equity investments.5 
Accordingly, the stock market losses, the bankruptcies and the corporate 
misconduct associated with them became of great interest to the public media 
and to elected officials in Washington and in state capitols.  
 The corporate failures were publicized as being wide-spread. They were in 
the sense that record levels of bankruptcies and corporate accounting 
restatements were reported that involved over 600 companies during a three 
year period. This is a large number of companies to be seen to have failed or 
acted badly (about 8% of all listed public companies in the US). However, most 
of these failures were not the result of malfeasance or violations of law (officers 
and directors of fewer than fifty public corporations were involved in criminal 
charges), but of corporate mistakes and mismanagement inside an environment 
of greater than usual risk-taking. And, of course, by far the greatest percentage 
of corporation did not fail nor were involved in scandals of any kind. 
However, inspired by the easy-money market bubble, many companies in 
the 1990s committed themselves to high-growth strategies that could only be 
sustained by aggressive corporate actions and “creative” accounting practices. 
Accountants were cooperative and accommodating, despite being pledged to a 
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role of independence, because of lucrative consulting fees available from large 
audit clients. Banks, brokers, asset managers and other intermediaries, enlarged 
by a decade of consolidation and deregulation, evolved into multi-line business 
platforms with considerable exposure to conflicts of interest, which, all too often, 
were resolved in their own favor. And even the SEC, the regulatory body 
responsible for financial markets and practices, had quietly sunk into 
ineffectiveness in the face of powerful resistance in Congress (resulting from 
lobbying and political contributions) to its efforts to improve accounting and other 
market practices in the 1990s. 6    
 Once motivated by a common desire to address corporate excesses and 
abuses, public officials, including regulators, enforcement agencies and 
legislatures, began to compete with each other in their zeal to “clean up” the 
mess and to “restore confidence” in financial markets. During the four years after 
Enron a great deal of energy was expended by government officials in doing this.  
 
Clean Up Actions since Enron 
Immediately after the Enron bankruptcy, committees of Congress began 
investigations and consideration of legislative action. These actions were 
accelerated with the collapse of WorldCom. In July 2002, President Bush 
directed the Justice Department to establish a Corporate Fraud Task Force to 
include a variety of prosecutors, investigators and technical experts. Within this 
group a separate Enron Task Force was also appointed. Henceforth, the SEC 
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and other enforcement agencies began an earnest effort to close in on those 
thought to be offenders.   
-- March 2002. The Justice Department chose to indict the firm of Arthur 
Andersen, Enron’s auditor, for obstructing justice. By this time certain 
Andersen partners had confessed to inappropriate document shredding, 
which was alleged to have been the consequence of a firm policy to 
destroy evidence that might be incriminating. Justice was also angered by 
Andersen’s role in the Enron case, which it believed was in violation of a 
consent decree extracted earlier in a fraud case involving Waste 
Management Corporation. In June 2002 Andersen was convicted of the 
charges, and as a result, immediately went out of business. In May, 2005 
Andersen’s conviction was overturned by the US Supreme Court though 
the firm was not, at the time, revivable.  
 
-- July 2002. A new federal omnibus accounting and corporate 
governance reform and improvement law, Sarbanes-Oxley, was passed 
and signed by the President. This was the most comprehensive and 
extensive federal securities legislation since the 1930s, requiring the SEC 
to draft numerous new “rules” to provide for its implementation. 
 
-- Beginning in April, 2003, more than $5 billion was collected from the 
financial services industry in a series of out-of-court settlements 
(orchestrated for the most part by NY State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer) 
with leading securities firms, mutual fund advisors, and insurance 
underwriters.  
 
-- The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were amended in November 2004. 
These guidelines, established by Congress in 1991 to increase penalties 
for “white-collar” offenses (making prison terms for white collar offenders 
much longer and less subject to parole) and to place significant burdens 
upon employers to cooperate with enforcement officials in order to avoid 
prosecution. The amended guidelines raised significantly the standards 
that corporations must meet to avoid indictment in criminal situations 
involving their employees. These standards included the need to 
demonstrate preventive efforts to provide a “focus on ethics and 
organizational culture,” and the ability to show that officers and directors 
understand and accept greater responsibility for assuring corporate 
compliance with these standards. However, the constitutionality of the 
sentencing guidelines was questioned in 2005 by the US Supreme Court, 
which reduced them from “mandatory” to “advisory.”  
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-- Prosecutions of corporate officials began 2002-2005. Officials of about 
thirty-five major public companies were charged with criminal activities. 
Several high visibility executives have been tried, convicted and punished 
with lengthy prison sentences– including Bernie Ebbers (WorldCom) who 
received 25 years in prison, John Rigas (Adelphia) 15 years, Andrew 
Fastow, CFO of Enron, 10 years, Denis Kozlowski (Tyco) 8 years, and 
Scott Sullivan CFO of WorldCom, 5 years.7 These executives have also 
been forced to turn over most of their remaining financial assets to the 
courts. Two other high profile executives, Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling of 
Enron await trial in early 2006. 
 
-- Sanford Weil of Citigroup and Maurice Greenberg of AIG, the powerful, 
billionaire CEOs of two of America’s most admired and successful 
financial corporations, were forced to resign by Mr. Spitzer – Weill in 
October 2003 and Greenberg in June 2005 -- who otherwise threatened to 
bring charges against their firms.  Mr. Weil resigned quietly without 
relating his decision to Mr. Spitzer, but Mr. Greenberg has denied all 
allegations and refused to cooperate with Mr. Spitzer’s office and 
accordingly is believed to face charges in the future.  
 
-- The former head of the New York Stock Exchange and a former 
chairman of its compensation committee were charged with fraud 
(excessive compensation) by Mr. Spitzer in May 2004. 
 
-- The plaintiff’s bar has been especially active with class action suits 
against banks, investment banks and accountants from which settlements 
aggregating more than $14 billion were agreed by mid-year 2005.  In the 
WorldCom and Enron cases, the plaintiff (a NY State pension fund), has 
insisted on the personal, uninsured participation in the financial settlement 
by the independent members of the boards of directors of the 
corporations,  
 
 After all of this, it would seem that those responsible for the worst 
corporate abuses have been (or will be) fairly (if harshly) punished, the financial 
market and corporate governance systems have been reformed and investors, 
indeed, can have confidence in the markets again. These were the popularly 
supported goals articulated by regulators, legislators and prosecutors when their 
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combined, interventions in the American business and financial marketplace 
began.  Many would be inclined to say that the goals have for the most part been 
achieved. 
 
Other Consequences of the Clean Up 
 The interventions, however, have left other consequences behind: 
-- More than 10,000 public companies now must each expend millions 
annually to comply with the many new check-list compliance requirements 
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC and the stock exchanges. The 
average initial cost of such compliance efforts, according to a 2005 study 
of 217 companies with average revenues of $5 billion by Financial 
Executives International, was $4.36 million, with smaller companies 
paying more per dollar of revenue than larger ones. In aggregate, some 
estimates of the overall front-end cost of Sarbanes-Oxley are as high as 
$20 billion, with perhaps $5 to $10 billion in annual follow on costs.8 In 
addition to the direct costs, compliance requires many hours of time of 
corporate officers and directors that divert them from managing their 
businesses, and may also reduce their tolerance for risk-taking. 9 Such 
cost estimates are considerable, but represent only a small fraction (0.1%) 
of the market capitalization of the country’s sock markets. The benefits of 
Sarbanes-Oxley are difficult to assess – most of the powers created by the 
law were already vested in the SEC, but not necessarily enforced 
effectively by it. The law requires a great deal of new compliance effort, 
but there is no assurance that had these been in place at the time Enron 
or WorldCom, which were accused of fraud and concealment, that the 
companies would not have failed as they did.   
 
-- The costs of financial intermediation (public offerings, bank loans, 
market-making, securities research and mutual funds) have also risen as 
a result of the Spitzer/SEC settlements involving an initial $1.5 billion cost 
and possibly another $1.0 billion per year in annual compliance costs for 
five years. These costs, though incurred by banks and brokers, are likely 
to be passed on to the users of American financial markets, which were 
already substantially regulated before Enron.  
 
-- More than half of the listed companies in America will be unable to 
expect research coverage by Wall Street financial analysts, which have 
reduced coverage of companies by about 20%, and many will find the 
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ongoing cost of being public companies to be a drag on their prospects 
and therefore may consider withdrawing from the public market, or 
alternatively, repositioning their securities in the increasingly robust Euro-
securities market. 
 
--The eagerness of state and federal prosecutors to bring charges against 
companies and executives has resulted in difficulties in proving the 
charges in court – the conviction of Arthur Andersen was overturned by 
the US Supreme Court because of inappropriate instructions of jurors, a 
problem that may also apply to the conviction of a CSFB executive (Frank 
Quattrone) which is currently under appeal. Richard Scrushy, CEO of 
HealthSouth, was acquitted of charges that were very similar to (and 
supported by similar testimony of other senior executives) those brought 
against WorldCom’s Bernie Ebbers, who, on the other hand, received a 
virtual life sentence for his actions. It took two trials to convict Dennis 
Kozlowski of misappropriating company funds, indicating that even in so-
called clear-cut cases, the jurors may not see things – or understand them 
-- as prosecutors wish them to. How the prosecutors will fare with the 
long-delayed but coming trials of Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron is 
yet to be seen.   
 
-- In the one and only case brought to trial by New York State Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer, Theodore Sihpol, a junior executive of Bank of 
America, was acquitted of most of the charges of fraud related to late-
trading at mutual funds because the jury was not persuaded that the 
actions taken by Mr. Sihpol were actually illegal under NY law. This result 
may encourage others charged by Spitzer, such as former NYSE CEO 
Richard Grasso, to force the NY Attorney General to prove charges 
against them to a jury, rather than to settle them as all of the corporate 
“targets” have done.  
 
--- All of the charges of alleged corporate misconduct brought by Spitzer 
were settled by the corporations involved to avoid the considerable risk 
and expense of trial, and in order to get the matter behind them. In such 
settlements, the defendant never admits guilt, and the record is sealed so 
there is no indication as to what actually happened in the situation or what 
laws were broken and how. As a result, settlements are not very useful in 
signaling how the law should be applied in the future.  
 
-- These legal actions, and the class action suits that have accompanied 
them, have collected billions of dollars for the government bodies and 
plaintiff groups bringing the suits. Individual investors experiencing the 
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losses caused by corporate malfeasance have recovered relatively little of 
it, and the worst of such offenders such as Enron and WorldCom have 
been bankrupted, leaving others, principally their banks, brokers, 
accountants and other intermediaries to pay for their actions as 
accessories. These intermediaries have been punished for their roles in 
allegedly assisting corporations accused of fraud in five different ways (1) 
by losses from loans extended to these companies, (2) by the financial 
penalties and settlements they have agreed to, (3) by the class-action 
litigation that has almost always followed, (4) by the loss of market value 
in their own stocks, and (5) by the cost of extensive additional legal and 
compliance measures needed to insure conformance with new regulations 
and business conduct standards imposed on them. Cumulatively, these 
burdens have been substantial for the corporate financial intermediaries 
involved -- some might say they have been excessive and unfair relative 
to what was alleged to have been done by them. The aggregate burden of 
these punishments has fallen heavily on the shareholders and employees 
of the intermediaries and affected their abilities to offer low cost services 
to financial market users.  In the long run, the boards of directors of these 
intermediaries must decide how active the firms are to be in assisting 
aggressive corporations in the future for fear that the penalties associated 
with charges of misconduct may substantially outweigh the benefits.  Such 
corporations would find investors reluctant to pay full price for their stock if 
overshadowed by a range of uncertainties regarding possible draconian 
punishments for doing business with the wrong clients.  This could change 
business strategies of the one or more of the large financial intermediaries 
considerably.  
 
-- The economic costs to the country of the various losses, penalties, 
class-action settlements, and added compliance costs since the fall of 
Enron, as large as they are in aggregate, have not constituted a significant 
percentage of American GDP. However, the cost of capital in the US will 
rise by some amount yet to be determined as a result of new regulations 
and compliance requirements, and the access to capital markets by large, 
dynamic and aggressive corporations and by smaller corporations seeking 
to become public companies may be more restricted. In aggregate these 
costs and effects could lead to a reduction in the national economic 
growth rate and rate of productivity increases, which in turn could 
adversely affect American prosperity and the future value of its many 
publicly-traded corporations. 
  
 Such consequences of meeting the goal of restoring confidence in 
financial markets may not be what was expected when the goal to clean up the 
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system was originally undertaken. We may have satisfied a sense of public 
outrage that followed a revelation of greed and misconduct, but if the cost of 
doing so was to adversely affect the prospects for economic growth in the 
country, and to obscure rather than clarify regulatory standards for the future, in 
an effort to prevent a small percentage of otherwise fully regulated American 
companies from committing fraud, then perhaps the cost was excessive. 
Especially as we have left untreated certain important defects in the system that 
can surface again at a later time.  
 
The Clean Up and American Regulatory Tradition 
 In the American tradition, the objectives of regulatory policy makers have 
been to seek the optimal balance of fair but free market activity at the lowest 
cost. Before 1925, there was no financial market regulation which may not have 
been necessary because of the relatively small participation in markets by 
unsophisticated retail investors. After 1925, mutual funds came to be sold 
actively as the roaring stock market of the time attracted retail investors seeking 
to share in the potential for capital gains. After the stock market crash in 1929, in 
which all investors lost considerable money on their investments, a new 
regulatory regime represented in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 was 
imposed. The new regime was based on required disclosure (including financial 
information audited by independent auditors), to be enforced through the courts 
by the new, fully empowered SEC. A well informed market, the theory held, 
 13
would essentially regulate itself by the continuous adjustment of prices and the 
checks and balances imposed by the large number of market participants.   
 Also in 1934, a seminal legal opinion was published by Judge Learned 
Hand of the US Second Court of Appeals in a tax related matter (Helvering v. 
Gregory) in which he said “nobody owes any public duty to pay more [taxes] than 
the law demands.” This idea, extended beyond taxes, became a central one in 
American administrative law: One does not have to comply with the law more 
than the law precisely requires.  Or, in other words, companies are not prohibited 
from doing their best to maximize their own results as long as they stay within the 
limits of the law. When it is uncertain what the limits of the law may be in a 
particular case, the company is not obliged to interpret the law in a manner most 
favorable to the government. The company’s interpretation of the law may be 
contested, and a law suit needed to resolve the matter, but nonetheless, 
companies are free to risk being contested if they want to. In our more modern 
terms, Enron, for example, may have chosen to interpret accounting rules related 
to off-balance sheet subsidiaries in a manner most favorable to it (though in its 
view still within the law), recognizing that the issue might be challenged by the 
government if it did so. But if Enron, arguing that it was a different kind of 
innovative, “new economy” company for which old-fashioned accounting 
principles were no longer appropriate, was not challenged by either its own 
independent auditors, outside legal counsel or the SEC, which it was not, then its 
own interpretation would prevail. If it were challenged, its policies might have to 
be changed, and results restated (and possibly some penalties incurred), but 
 14
simply being challenged should not in itself be a crime, as long as the company 
did not use fraud or deception to persuade its accountants or others to accept its 
interpretation.10  
This line of reasoning fit very well into aggressive corporate growth 
strategies aimed at maximizing shareholder value that were widely adopted 
during the 1980s and 1990s. During this twenty-year period the market 
capitalization of US equity securities increased fourteen-fold, or at an annualized 
rate of growth of nearly 15%, a rate never sustained for such a long time before. 
Great fortunes were made by many investors and corporate officers and directors 
during this period. Shareholders wanted their companies to grow, and selected 
directors who would choose and provide incentives to managers who would 
adopt dynamic, aggressive policies to do so. Managers pushed for large 
acquisitions, compensation practices and accounting policies that could best help 
them in their task, without, in many cases, fully describing the risk inherent in 
such policies. But the policies were rewarded by stock price appreciation, and 
deemed to be successful. Indeed, management compensation incentives 
reached their all time peak about the same time as the stock market did.  
 There was a lot of growth in the 1980s and 1990s, only a small portion of 
which was affected by fraud, and the fraud was detected and addressed without 
the benefit of the corporate governance procedures required by Sarbanes Oxley. 
As happens during bubbles – we had four during the twentieth century -- a lot of 
things can go wrong while under the spell of rising markets and easy pickings: 
the accounting industry may have become too compliant with client wishes, 
 15
mutual fund managers may have accepted improper trades, and underwriters 
over-hyped Internet IPOs and provided insincere research, but the power to 
enforce the laws prohibiting such abuses was already vested in the SEC. After 
Enron, the market adjusted securities prices to reflect concerns over false 
accounting and other suspected wrongdoing, but the public appeared to want 
even stronger measures so, after the failure of WorldCom in 2002, Congress was 
able to pass a quickly cobbled together Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a comprehensive 
federal law embracing accounting and corporate governance issues but lacking a 
central theory and duplicating some existing powers and authorities. Eliot 
Spitzer’s large scale settlement with the leading underwriting firms and with 
several mutual fund management companies came next, followed by settlements 
with class actions litigants. The cost of these several actions will tax future 
growth but perhaps will do little to avoid future problems if the central question of 
the period is not addressed in the reform measures to be taken. And the central 
question is “where was the SEC and the other checks and balances in the 
system when the abuses were taking place?”  
 
Weakened Checks and Balances 
 Corporations are creations of state law which imposes fiduciary duties on 
their directors and principle officers. The principle securities laws of the United 
States are federal, and the SEC which is empowered to enforce them, is not 
permitted to act in matters of state law, where the fiduciary duties of officers and 
directors are found. As a result, the SEC chose not to pursue the officers and 
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directors of companies like Enron for violation of fiduciary duties (though 
conceivably it might have done so relying upon the interstate commerce clause 
of the US Constitution to justify it), leaving such prosecutions instead to the state 
courts, or, in the case of criminal actions, to the Justice Department which would 
be restricted to bringing charges of fraud under federal law, often a more difficult 
set of charges to prove than fiduciary misconduct. The chairman and four 
commissioners of the SEC are appointed by the President, with two of the 
commissioners being required to be from the opposition party. Even the most 
earnest and capable of SEC chairmen have found the political limitations of the 
job to be formidable. As a result, much of the power of the SEC has either been 
delegated to self-regulatory bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (responsible for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) or the New 
York Stock Exchange, or it must depend on adequate funding from Congress to 
be applied. During the Bush administration three supposedly “business-friendly” 
SEC chairmen have served, though with each of the first two being replaced 
before their terms expired by the President.  
  Most states employ a version of the “business judgment rule” in which the 
court is to give the benefit of the doubt to corporate boards which act legally and 
in good faith. That is, the court will accept the assumption that a business 
decision made by a board that acts in accordance with its fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty was a valid business decision that may not be second-guessed. As 
recently as August 2005, the Delaware Chancery Court found in favor of the 
directors of the Walt Disney Corporation who had been charged by shareholders 
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with breach of fiduciary duty in the case of the hiring and firing of a former 
president, Michael Ovitz. The court found that as passive, slipshod and 
disinterested as the Disney board may have been in performing its duties (and 
the court found that there was much fault to be found), the board’s disputed 
conduct had not risen to the level of bad faith, and therefore the business 
judgment of the board in the Ovitz case could not be questioned.  
 If for some reason, however, the good faith test of the business judgment 
rule was not met in a case such as Enron, and/or individual directors should be 
convicted of fraud under federal law, then the directors involved (assuming they 
had not committed “gross negligence”) could look first to the company (and its 
shareholders) to indemnify them against any legal expense or judgment against 
them, and should the company be unable to meet such an expense, then to 
insurance policies paid for by the company to back up the indemnification. So, 
short of committing gross negligence, individual corporate directors (further 
protected by the business judgment rule) have been able to expect not to be 
personally liable for their actions and decisions. 
 Being so protected, directors (who benefit in various ways by their 
directorships) cannot be blamed for lapsing into a state of uncritical support for 
management, or for generally being unwilling to appear aggressive in their crucial 
role as on-the-scene representative of the shareholders.11  This problem of 
diffident directors appears in all corporate organizations that operate in financial 
markets – including among directors of mutual funds, banks, brokerages and 
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insurance firms – all of whom are part of the interacting forces in the market that 
provide its checks and balances.  
 Altogether, there is substantial asymmetry between the powerful 
incentives offered to achieve increases in shareholder value through aggressive 
corporate actions and the natural restraining forces of fiduciary duties applicable 
to individual officers and directors. This asymmetry has always been difficult to 
manage and largely explains the continuing outbreak of corporate failures and 
scandals over time (despite efforts to improve corporate governance procedures 
going back at least two decades) but it has not been altered by any of the 
legislative or enforcement actions taken since the collapse of Enron four years 
ago.  
 
The Tilt in the Market 
 This asymmetry in effect creates a tilt in the market to favor those in 
positions of control and influence over those without it. A modest tilt may be 
tolerable, but a larger one can be very dangerous to the economic system, as 
recent years have indicated. One remedy would be to force companies through 
regulation to adopt more conservative competitive policies that would involve less 
risk of compliance failure. Such a remedy would, however, surely constrain 
innovation, risk-taking and growth-oriented competitive strategies that the country 
depends on for its economic growth. Another approach would be to find ways to 
stiffen the fiduciary liabilities of corporate officials and of financial intermediaries 
and agents, so as to encourage them to discipline management and their own 
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employees more effectively. Though this should be done, and could be, it is very 
likely to be resisted strenuously by those bearing the fiduciary liabilities and these 
individuals are powerful and influential people.  
 If neither of these remedies are likely to occur, which appears to be the 
case, then the best remaining solution is to assist the market to sharpen its 
abilities to sort out dangerous investments from solid ones, by encouraging 
independent investors, accountants, analysts, and market-makers from being 
conflicted by business interests of their own that are placed ahead of the 
interests of their clients. Once the market understands that a corporation’s 
strategy is risky or controversial or too close to regulatory intervention, then its 
stock price should suffer, which tends to deflate the strategy. But to restore a 
crisp, self-policing quality to the market means restoring the respect for the 
independent firm whose business is not conflicted by too many products and 
services. This must start with the accountants (as Sarbanes Oxley requires) so 
that the market can rely on the financial information being disclosed being 
accurate. Regulators must appreciate the natural lassitude of so-called 
“independent” directors, and find ways to prick them into performing their 
fiduciary duties more alertly and skeptically. Surely after the shocks experienced 
by the market in 2000-2003, investors can expect the market to straighten out 
and sharpened up, but the task is to keep it that way well into the next iteration of 
the “new economy.” 
 
Free-Market Capitalism in a Democracy 
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 We fool ourselves if we think that a government regulatory regime will 
eliminate by itself all the problems that appear in free and active financial 
markets. And we make ourselves even greater fools if we think that increasing 
regulation beyond its economically optimal point is in our interests. Excessive 
regulation is as harmful as insufficient regulation. Sarbanes Oxley may have 
pushed regulation a bit too far, if so, time will tell and the act can either be 
amended or the SEC can re-interpret it. The same may be true of the activities of 
state and federal prosecutors and of class action litigants. The most important 
lesson of the recent period of corporate excess may be the one that should have 
already been learned by the supporters of unfettered capitalism in the United 
States – that capitalism must be understood by the whole country, not just by the 
capitalists, to be good for it, and if capitalism is seen to be abusive (rightly or 
wrongly), then it will be ended or reformed. Indeed free-market supporters such 
as the authors must realize that abuse can be expected to have its retribution in 
a democratic society, and that retribution is likely to be swift, harsh and possibly 
unfair when it finally comes.  Thus, abuses should be prevented.   
  For this understanding to develop, capitalists themselves should attempt 
to contribute to a national consensus that good business is fair business, and the 
emphasis must be placed by investors and by regulators to insure that the 
information being processed by market forces is as timely and accurate as it is 
supposed to be, and that conflicts of interest, which lay behind many of the 
abuses of the late 1990s, must be neutralized by their identification and 
disclosure, and then by allowing market forces to react to the information. The 
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market may decide that firms with too many conflicts, or firms that are too big to 
control the conflicts they have, may be dangerous to invest in. If so, the market 
prices and business strategies of such firms are likely to change.  
 Equally, regulators and enforcement agencies should use their powers to 
insist on the proper performance of the fiduciary duties that corporate directors, 
institutional investors and intermediaries have in common. The importance of 
these duties cannot be left in second place behind corporate goal achievement. 
A powerful signal by the SEC and some important state agencies that ways will 
be found to insure that fiduciary duties are taken seriously by officers and 
directors will show itself in various useful ways – by causing independent 
directors to be more concerned about their own liabilities, by increased officer 
and directors insurance rates, and by continuing interest in corporate governance 
by public sector institutional investors, such as state pension funds. In aggregate 
these fiduciary concerns can begin to constitute a market force of their own. 
The sooner market participants recognize the value of returning to an 
untilted marketplace, the sooner may be the time when Sarbanes-Oxley might be 
amended to remove expensive but unnecessary provisions. 
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